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RECOVERY FOR ECONOMIC LOSS UNDER A
PRODUCTS LIABILITY THEORY: FROM
THE BEGINNING THROUGH THE
CURRENT TREND
INTRODUCTION
Most courts relegate claims for purely economic loss to the
realm of contract warranty law. However, when a court
states that it does not allow a strict liability in tort recovery
for a purely economic loss, it imparts information that, stand-
ing alone, is of little value. The manner in which courts dis-
tinguish economic loss from other damage must be scrutinized
in order to give this generalization meaning.
The classification of an injury' into one of three categories
is the first step in distinguishing actions which are recoverable
in tort from those recoverable in contract. Defective products
can cause three types of injury: personal injury, property dam-
age and economic loss. Personal injury results when the de-
fective product causes injury to a person. Property damage
results when the defective product causes physical injury to
other property.2  Some courts3 encompass damage to the
product itself within the definition of property damage; other
courts4 relegate such damage to the category of economic loss.
1. See Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979);
Sioux City Community School Dist. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 461 F. Supp.
662 (N.D. Iowa 1978); Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Ariz. Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz.
444, 666 P.2d 544 (1983).
2. See Mead, 465 F. Supp. 355; Sioux, 461 F. Supp. 662; Arrow, 136 Ariz. 444, 666
P.2d 544.
3. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165
(3d Cir. 1981) (applying Pennsylvania law); Corporate Air Fleet, Inc. v. Gates Learjet,
Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Tenn. 1984); City of Clayton v. Gruman Emergency
Prods., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248
(Alaska 1977); Arrow, 136 Ariz. 444, 666 P.2d 544 (applying Arizona law); Seely v.
White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Vulcan Materials
Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253 (1983) (applying Georgia law); Bagel
v. American Honda Motor Co., 132 Ill. App. 3d 82, 477 N.E.2d 54 (1985).
4. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Major Tool & Mach., Inc., 767 F.2d 446
(8th Cir. 1985). Under Minnesota law, where a component part damages another com-
ponent part of the same item, it is classified as damage to the product itself, and not as
damage to "other" property. Only personal physical injury and damage to other prop-
erty due to a defective product are compensable under a strict liability in tort theory in
Minnesota. Id.; James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (where
damage to a helicopter that crashed was the only loss sustained by plaintiff, the plaintiff
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Economic loss is "the diminution in the value of the product
because it is inferior in quality and does not work for the gen-
eral purposes for which it was manufactured and sold." 5
Economic loss, which includes items such as cost of re-
pairs, cost of replacement and loss of profits, has two compo-
nents, direct loss and consequential loss.6
Direct economic loss may be said to encompass damage
based on insufficient product value; thus, direct economic
loss may be "out of pocket" - the difference in value be-
tween what is given and received - or "loss of bargain" -
the difference between the value of what is received and its
value as represented. Direct economic loss also may be mea-
sured by costs of replacement and repair. Consequential
economic loss includes all indirect loss, such as loss of profits
resulting from inability to make use of the defective
product.7
Most courts8 do not allow tort recovery for purely economic
loss in the absence of any personal injury or property damage.
could not recover under strict liability in tort). Under Texas law, "damage to the prod-
uct itself is essentially a loss to the purchaser or [sic] the benefit of the bargain with the
seller. Loss of use and cost of repair of the product are the only expenses suffered by the
purchaser." Id. at 171 (quoting Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spray-
ing Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308, 313 (Tex. 1978)); Sioux, 461 F. Supp. 662 (the court barred
recovery under strict liability in tort for damage solely to the defective product itself
unless evidence of unequal bargaining power exists or the product sustains a non-eco-
nomic loss injury); State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349 (1984).
5. Comment, Manufacturers' Liability to Remote Purchasers for "Economic Loss"
Damages - Tort or Contract?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 539, 541 (1966).
6. See Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L.
REv. 917, 918 (1966).
7. Id. at 918 (citations omitted).
8. See American Home, 767 F.2d 446; Henry Heide v. WRH Prods. Co., 766 F.2d
105 (3d Cir. 1985); James, 715 F.2d 166; Corporate Air Fleet v. Gates Learjet, Inc., 589
F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Tenn. 1984); City of Clayton v. Gruman Emergency Prods., 576
F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Sioux, 461 F. Supp. 662; Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563
P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977); Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Ariz. Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz.
444, 666 P.2d 544 (1983); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17 (1965); Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253
(1983); Mitchell, 108 Idaho 335, 699 P.2d 1349; Bagel v. American Honda Motor Co.,
132 Ill. App. 3d 82, 477 N.E.2d 54 (1985); National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube
Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983). But see Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor
Co., 26 Mich. App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970) (The commercial purchaser of defec-
tive golf carts sustained loss of profit and cost of repair when the carts broke down due
to deterioration of their parts. The court held the manufacturer liable in tort for the
purely economic loss of the purchaser.); Santor v. Kargheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207
A.2d 305 (1965); Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 42 Ohio St. 2d 88, 326 N.E.2d
267 (1975) (Small holes appeared in the consumer's concrete driveway shortly after it
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However, the method for categorizing a loss is so varied that a
claim not recoverable in tort because it constitutes an eco-
nomic loss in Idaho9 may be recoverable in tort in Illinois 0
where it is classified as a claim for property damage.
This Comment will address four aspects of economic loss
recovery. Part I will examine the landmark cases that form
the basis for divergent views. Part II will look at the history
of economic loss recovery. Part III will explore the modem
trends in economic loss recovery. In conclusion, Part IV will
suggest a unified approach to determine whether a purely eco-
nomic loss should be compensable under a strict liability in
tort theory.
I. THE BEGINNING OF THE CONTROVERSY: THE
LANDMARK CASES WHICH FORM THE BASIS OF
THE DIVERGENT VIEWS
The controversy over whether economic losses are recov-
erable under a strict liability in tort theory began with the
landmark cases of Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc.,II and Seely v.
White Motor Co. 12 In Santor, the plaintiff purchased carpet-
ing for his home from a dealer. 13 The carpeting became
unaesthetic in appearance due to certain defects, 14 causing
Santor to suffer a purely economic loss.' 5 Santor sued the
manufacturer of the carpeting for breach of implied warranty,
seeking the difference between the price he paid and the actual
was poured. The court held that the manufacturer of the concrete was liable to the
consumer under a "strict liability theory for the purely economic loss.); Berg v. General
Motors Corp., 87 Wash. 2d 584, 555 P.2d 818 (1976).
9. For an example of Idaho case law on this issue, see Mitchell, 108 Idaho 335, 699
P.2d 1349. The court held that where the only damage was to the roof itself, the plain-
tiff could not recover damages for the repair of the roof under a strict liability in tort
theory.
10. Two of the leading Illinois cases in this area are Vaughn v. General Motors
Corp., 102 Ill. 2d 431, 466 N.E.2d 195 (1984), and Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National
Tank Co., 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982). The approach taken by the Illinois
court is in accord with the approach taken by the Pennsylvania court in Pennsylvania
Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981); see infra
notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
11. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
12. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
13. Santor, 44 N.J. at 53, 207 A.2d at 307.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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market value as damages. The Supreme Court of New Jersey
held that the plaintiff could maintain a breach of warranty
claim against the manufacturer despite the lack of privity be-
tween them. 16
In dicta, the Santor court stated that the plaintiff also pos-
sessed a cause of action for strict tort liability.17 In essence,
the court said that strict liability in tort was applicable to a
purely direct economic loss fact situation when the victim is
the ultimate consumer. This tort doctrine, in the view of the
court, was the long-awaited mechanism to overcome privity of
contract requirements and for the ultimate consumer to gain
relief from the manufacturer of an unsatisfactory product.18
The obligation of the manufacturer thus becomes what in
justice it ought to be - an enterprise liability, and one which
should not depend upon the intricacies of the law of sales.
The purpose of such liability is to insure that the cost of inju-
ries or damage, either to the goods sold or to other property,
resulting from defective products, is borne by the makers of
the products who put them in the channels of trade, rather
than by the injured or damaged persons who ordinarily are
powerless to protect themselves.1 9
The Santor court espoused the view that this doctrine
should not be limited to cases of personal injury, but should
apply even where the damage from the defective product was
to the product itself or to the possessor's other property.20
Significantly, the court defined a defective product as one "not
reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes for which such arti-
cles are sold or used, ' 21 a contrast from the unreasonably dan-
gerous 22 language of section 402A of the Restatement
16. Id.
17. Id. at 63, 207 A.2d at 311.
18. Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 311.
19. Id. at 64-65, 207 A.2d at 311-12.
20. Id. at 65, 207 A.2d at 312. The court reasoned: "[A]Ithough the doctrine has
been applied principally in connection with personal injuries sustained by expected
users from products which are dangerous when defective.., the responsibility of the
maker should be no different where damage to the article sold or to other property of
the consumer is involved." Id. (citation omitted).
21. Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 313.
22. The New Jersey court rejected the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement of
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965), in Suter v. San Angelo Foundry &
Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 174-77, 406 A.2d 140, 149-51 (1979). The court stated that a
jury in a strict liability action would be charged in terms of whether the product was
1987]
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(Second) Of Torts.23 In toto, the Santor court viewed the doc-
trine of strict liability in tort as having a wide breadth of ap-
plicability, spilling over into an area of damages once under
the sole domain of contract law.
The Seely court took exception to this broad application of
the strict liability in tort doctrine as espoused by the court in
Santor.2 4 In dicta, the Seely court stated that a strict liability
in tort theory should never be used to recover for purely eco-
nomic loss, as the failure of the product to perform to a
party's expectations is a concept grounded in contract, not
tort.25 Judge Traynor, writing for the court, stressed the sig-
nificance of the delineation between contract law and tort law:
The distinction that the law has drawn between tort recov-
ery for physical injuries and warranty recovery for economic
loss is not arbitrary and does not rest on the "luck" of one
plaintiff in having an accident causing physical injury. The
distinction rests, rather, on an understanding of the nature
of the responsibility a manufacturer must undertake in dis-
tributing his products. He can appropriately be held liable
for physical injuries caused by defects by requiring his goods
to match a standard of safety defined in terms of conditions
that create unreasonable risks of harm. He cannot be held
for the level of performance of his products in the con-
sumer's business unless he agrees that the product was
designed to meet the consumer's demands. A consumer
should not be charged at the will of the manufacturer with
bearing the risk ofphysical injury when he buys a product on
the market. He can, however, be fairly charged with the risk
that the product will not match his economic expectations un-
less the manufacturer agrees that it will. Even in actions for
negligence, a manufacturer's liability is limited to damages
for physical injuries and there is no recovery for economic
loss alone.26
reasonably fit, suitable and safe for its intended or foreseeable purposes when inserted
by the defendant into the stream of commerce and, if not, whether as a result damage or
injury was incurred by the contemplated users or others who might reasonably be ex-
pected to come in contact with it. Id.
23. The decisions in both Santor and Seely pre-date the adoption of § 402A.
24. The court opined: "We are of the opinion, however, that it was inappropriate
to impose liability ... in the Santor case, for it would result in imposing liability without
regard to what representations of quality the manufacturer made." Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at
-, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
25. Id. at -' 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
26. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23 (emphasis added).
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On the basis of this reasoning, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia held that the plaintiff could recover lost profits and the
purchase price on the basis of the express warranty between
the parties, but denied the plaintiff's strict liability in tort
claim for these items.27
In Seely, the plaintiff purchased a truck manufactured by
the White Motor Company for use in his heavy-duty hauling
business. 28 White expressly warranted the truck to be free of
defects.29 The truck was afflicted with a condition known as
"galloping," which caused it to bounce violently.30 This de-
fective condition was not corrected, despite many efforts by
the dealer to do So. 3 1 About eleven months after the purchase
date, the truck's brakes failed and the truck overturned.32 The
plaintiff was not injured, but the truck sustained physical
damage. 33 The plaintiff brought suit for repair costs, loss of
profits due to loss of normal use of the truck, and return of the
purchase price.34
The court denied the plaintiff recovery for the cost of re-
pairing the truck. Recovery was denied not because the dam-
age was to the defective product itself and not because the
repair costs were classified as a purely economic loss, but be-
cause the plaintiff failed to prove that a defect in the truck
caused the accident. Significantly, the Seely court stated
that "[p]hysical injury to property is so akin to personal injury
that there is no reason for distinguishing them."'3 6 Thus, the
27. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 148-49, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20-21.
28. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
29. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 148, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
30. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
31. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
32. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
33. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 147, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19.
34. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 147-48, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 19-20.
35. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24. Explaining its refusal to allow
recovery in this instance, the court stated:
Plaintiff contends that, even though the law of warranty governs the economic
relations between the parties, the doctrine of strict liability in tort should be
extended to govern physical injury to plaintiff's property, as well as personal
injury. We agree with this contention. Physical injury to property is so akin to
personal injury that there is no reason for distinguishing them. In this case how-
ever, the trial court found that there was no proof that the defect caused the
physical damage of the truck.
Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24 (citations omitted).
36. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24.
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Seely court would have granted the plaintiff recovery of the
cost of repairing the truck itself under a strict liability theory
if the plaintiff had proved that a defect in the truck caused the
accident.
The crux of the distinction between the decision in Santor
and that in Seely thus rests in their disagreement over which
type of risk is recoverable under a strict liability theory and
not in the item for which a damage recovery is claimed. The
plaintiffs in both Santor and Seely sought recovery for dam-
ages which are typically classified as economic losses37 - loss
of the bargain (Santor) and repair costs (Seely). The losses in
both Santor and Seely occurred when the product itself was
damaged. The Seely court was not adverse to allowing a strict
liability recovery where only the product itself was damaged.
The distinction, therefore, lies in the type of risk which the
buyer of the product sustained. In Seely, the defect in the
truck allegedly posed a sudden, unreasonable risk of physical
injury to both the plaintiff and to the truck itself. In Santor,
the carpeting was not defective or unreasonably dangerous,
and did not pose a sudden risk of physical injury to the plain-
tiff or the carpeting itself. Rather, the plaintiff in Santor in-
curred the risk of unfulfilled economic expectations. The
nature of the risk has played an important role in the develop-
ing case law.
II. THE OVERLAP OF TORT AND CONTRACT: THE
RATIONALE FOR KEEPING THEM DISTINCT
The tort theory of products liability has its roots in con-
tract law, growing out of the contract cause of action for
breach of warranty.38 The doctrine of strict liability in a prod-
ucts liability fact situation was formulated in Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc. 3 9 The Greenman court held that a
manufacturer is strictly liable when a defective product placed
on the market causes personal injury.4° The court stated that
where strict liability is not assumed by agreement of the par-
37. See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text.
38. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165,
1168 (3d Cir. 1981). See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 97 (5th ed. 1984).
39. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
40. Id. at 60, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
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ties but is imposed by law, the liability, even if arising out of
an implied warranty, is governed by the law of tort. 1 Recov-
ery under strict products liability was broadened to allow re-
covery for property damage by section 402A of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which states: "One who sells
any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or con-
sumer, or to his property."42
Prior to the Greenman decision, 3 in the absence of proof
of the manufacturer's negligence, a person physically injured
by a defective product had only a cause of action for breach of
warranty. 44 As a result, a physically injured victim, who was
not in privity of contract with the manufacturer or who failed
to comply with the breach of warranty notice requirements,
lacked a remedy against the manufacturer of the defective
product.45 Even where courts dropped the privity and notice
requirements, "[o]nly by some violent pounding and twist-
41. Id. at 61, 377 P.2d at 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701.
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (emphasis added). Section
402A provides:
Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into
any contractual relation with the seller.
43. As a result of the decision in Greenman and the adoption of § 402A by most
states, a plaintiff seeking damages caused by a defective product has three alternative
causes of action against the manufacturer. These are negligence in tort, strict liability in
tort and breach of warranty. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 38, § 98.
44. See Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). See gener-
ally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 38, § 98.
45. See generally Greenman, 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697; W.
PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 38, §§ 97-98.
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ing"46 could the warranty doctrine be made to meet the plight
of individuals injured by defective products.47
While breach of warranty and products liability evolved
from common ground, they are premised on different public
policy rationales. Tort law has traditionally been a means of
compensation for injury to a person or property, with the obli-
gation to compensate the victim being imposed by law.4  Con-
tract law is concerned with the bargain the parties enter into
by mutual agreement; the obligation to comply with the agree-
ment rests in the bargain itself.49 Differing policies of risk al-
location underlie the two theories.50
Contract warranty law protects the expectation interests
that arise out of these bargains, providing a remedy where the
product fails to perform as expected or is not of a quality fit
for ordinary use. 1 Products liability law allows a consumer
46. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, _, 403 P.2d 145, 149, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17,
21 (1965) (quoting Patterson, The Apportionment of Business Risks Through Legal De-
vices, 24 COLUM. L. REV. 335, 358 (1924)). For affirmation of this view, see Ketterer v.
Armour & Co., 200 F. 322, 323 (S.D.N.Y. 1912), where the court stated that "[t]he
remedies of injured consumers ought not to be made to depend upon the intricacies of
the law of sales." See generally Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791
(1966); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960).
47. The Uniform Commercial Code contains three provisions, § 2-715(2)(b), § 2-
318 and § 2-719(3), which allow recovery for physical harm to purchasers under a war-
ranty theory.
48. For interesting discussions of the differences between tort and contract law, see
generally Dundee Cement Co. v. Chemical Laboratories Inc., 712 F.2d 1166 (7th Cir.
1983) (applying Illinois law); Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying Pennsylvania law); Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980) (applying Illinois
law); Corporate Air Fleet v. Gates Learjet, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Tenn. 1984);
Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
49. See cases cited supra note 48.
50. The public policy rationale of strict liability in tort is to protect the consumer
and allocate loss to the manufacturer, the entity most able to bear the risk. See Scandi-
navian Airlines Sys. v. United Aircraft Corp., 601 F.2d 425, 428 (9th Cir. 1979).
51. One court contrasted the policy distinctions between contract and tort law as
follows:
The gist of a products liability tort case is not that the plaintiff failed to receive
the quality of product he expected, but that the plaintiff has been exposed,
through a hazardous product, to an unreasonable risk of injury to his person or
his property. On the other hand, contract law, which protects expectation inter-
ests, provides the appropriate set of rules when an individual wishes a product to
perform a certain task in a certain way, or expects or desires a product of a
particular quality so that it is fit for ordinary use.
Pennsylvania Glass, 652 F.2d at 1169 (footnotes omitted).
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who is not in privity of contract with the manufacturer to re-
cover for personal injury and property damage caused by a
defective, unreasonably dangerous product. 2 Recovery for a
reduction in the value of the product due to an inherent defect
is classified as an economic loss and lies in contract law. Re-
covery for physical harm to a person due to a hazardous prod-
uct lies in tort.
The basis of products liability is to place the cost of the
injury from the defective product on the manufacturer, the
entity best able to bear the cost and spread the risk. 3
The purpose of such liability is to ensure that the cost of
injuries or damages, either to the goods sold or to other
property, resulting from defective products, is borne by the
makers of the products . . . rather than by the injured or
damaged persons who ordinarily are powerless to protect
themselves. 4
In contrast, contract warranty law allows commercial parties
of equal bargaining power to allocate the risk of a loss between
themselves. A party to a commercial contract may choose to
forego a remedy in exchange for a lower purchase price. In
any event, commercial parties of equal bargaining power are
deemed able to protect themselves from economic loss due to
a product that does not perform to their expectations. 6
52. See generally Wade, Is Section 402A of the Second Restatement of Torts Pre-
empted by the UCC and Therefore Unconstitutional?, 42 TENN. L. REv. 123 (1979).
53. The price of the product thus reflects the manufacturer's absorption of this
cost. As one court explained:
The imposition on manufacturers of strict liability for defective products accom-
plishes the cost internalization that the price mechanism cannot achieve by plac-
ing the complete cost of the injuries on the manufacturer. In turn, the
manufacturer can allocate a portion of that cost to the purchasers of its products
in the form of higher prices.
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir.
1980) (footnotes omitted).
54. Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc. 44 N.J. 52, -, 207 A.2d 305, 312 (1965).
55. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316 creates the seller's power to limit his liabil-
ity. See generally Note, supra note 6, at 959-61, 965.
56. The mechanism for this self-protection lies in the fact that the price of the
product will reflect the amount of protection bargained for. As one court explained:
The original purchaser, particularly a large company . . . can protect itself
against the risk of unsatisfactory performance by bargaining for a warranty. Al-
ternatively, it may choose to forgo warranty protection in favor of a lower
purchase price for the product. Subsequent purchasers may do likewise in bar-
gaining over the price of the product. In any event, because persons other than
the owner of the product will not incur economic losses resulting from the prod-
1987]
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The tort theory of strict liability expressed in section 402A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, and the contract theory
of warranty articulated in sections 2-314 and 2-315 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, do overlap.57 However, most courts
delineate those losses compensable under tort theory from
those compensable under contract. Some courts justify this
delineation on the ground that allowance of a recovery for a
purely economic loss under a strict liability theory would not
only infringe upon the Code, but emasculate it."' Essentially
the doctrine of strict liability in tort, which does not permit a
manufacturer to limit its liability by waiver or agreement,
would infringe upon the principles of sales transactions set
forth in the Code. 9 "The extension of strict liability to cover
economic losses in effect would make a manufacturer the
guarantor that all of its products would continue to perform
satisfactorily throughout their reasonably productive life."60
uct's poor performance, the costs associated with economic loss will likely be
reflected in the price of the product.
Jones & Laughlin,, 626 F.2d at 288-89.
57. Even though the two modes of recovery overlap, the field of warranty has been
zealously safe-guarded as a distinct area. As one court stated:
Although strict liability in tort developed out of the law of warranties, the courts
of most states have recognized that the principles of warranty law remain the
appropriate vehicle to redress a purchaser's disappointed expectations when a
defect renders a product inferior or unable adequately to perform its intended
function.... These courts have classified the damages consequent to qualitative
defects, such as reduced value, return of purchase price, repair and replacement,
or lost profits, as economic loss, and have relegated those who suffer such com-
mercial loss to the remedies of contract law.
Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, _, 306 S.E.2d 253, 256 (1983)
(quoting Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165,
1169-73 (3d Cir. 1981)).
58. See American Home Assurance Co. v. Major Tool & Mach., Inc., 767 F.2d 446
(8th Cir. 1985).
59. See Franklin, When Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in De-
fective Product Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 989 (1966), where the author states:
It is striking that those who would use tort law to protect consumers in defective
product cases do so with only the most cursory explicit recognition that there
may already be a body of law directed toward regulating the rights of buyers and
sellers, and a statutory body at that. The courts are operating at the border of an
area considered by draftsmen at great length and framed in legislation arguably
relevant to the cases before the courts. Yet, those judges appear either unaware
of the merging of the tort and sales lines or else unwilling to consider the possible
limitations legislation may impose on traditional judicial primacy in tort law.
Id.
60. Jones & Laughlin, 626 F.2d at 289.
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In contrast, the Code allows parties to limit or eliminate their
liability for economic losses, providing a comprehensive statu-
tory scheme to fill the needs of commerce.6 1 Based on the dif-
ferent policies underlying the two theories, some courts allow
for recovery of purely economic loss under a strict liability in
tort theory and others do not.
III. THE MODERN TRENDS IN EcONOMIc Loss
RECOVERY
A court that states it does not allow recovery for a purely
economic loss imparts information which, standing alone, is of
little value.62 The largest discrepancy in what the term "eco-
nomic loss" includes arises in a situation where the only harm
alleged is to the product itself63
Where the defective product alone is damaged, some
courts classify this damage as economic loss. These courts bar
recovery under a strict liability in tort theory unless there is
personal injury or damage to property other than the product.
According to these courts,64 damage to the product alone is
economic loss and not compensable under a strict liability in
tort theory.
Other courts allow recovery under strict liability in tort
where only the product itself is damaged. These courts ascer-
tain whether the damage constitutes property damage or mere
economic loss. 65 However, where the damage to the product
falls within the constraints of property damage, the claim is
compensable under a strict liability theory. Where the dam-
age is classified as an economic loss, recovery in tort is barred.
61. Id.
62. The question of what constitutes an economic loss is important because many
courts do not allow for the recovery of economic loss in a product liability action.
Whether courts construe RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) broadly or
narrowly often determines whether or not they allow recovery for economic loss. Thus,
the issue of what constitutes property damage under § 402A is often before the courts.
63. The courts utilize three approaches to the economic loss issue. For a break-
down of the courts by category, see Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Mansville
Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280 (3d Cir. 1980).
64. See cases cited supra note 4 for a listing of courts which do not allow recovery
in strict liability in tort for damage only to the product itself.
65. See cases cited supra note 3 for courts which do allow recovery under some
circumstances, in strict liability tort, for damage only to the product itself.
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In contrast, the New Jersey court permits strict liability in
tort recovery for economic loss. Traditionally, the New Jersey
court has not paid great attention to whether the damage sus-
tained falls into one category or the other; recovery is permit-
ted in either event.66 Courts which bar recovery in tort for
pure economic loss, however, devote a major portion of each
strict liability decision to categorizing the loss.
Two cases decided by the Alaska Supreme Court illustrate
the court's painstaking delineation of property damage from
economic loss. In both cases the defective product was a mo-
bile home and the only damage sustained was to the product
itself. The Alaska Supreme Court, however, resolved the
cases differently, rejecting the plaintiffs' strict liability theory
in Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc. ,67 but allowing the plain-
tiffs to recover under a strict liability theory in Cloud v. Kit
Manufacturing Co. 68
In Morrow, the plaintiffs alleged that the mobile home they
had purchased was defectively manufactured. The defects in
the home, including a leaky roof, cracked windows and an
inoperable furnace, became apparent over time.69 The defects
did not pose a risk of physical injury to the plaintiffs or their
property, and the loss of the benefit of their bargain was the
only damage suffered by the plaintiffs.
In Cloud, the plaintiffs purchased a mobile home that
came equipped with polyurethane carpet padding. The mo-
bile home was suddenly and calamitously destroyed by fire
when the foam padding was ignited by a heating unit.7°
Although the plaintiffs did not suffer physical injuries, the na-
ture of the defect posed a risk to their safety. The court classi-
fied the loss as property damage.
66. See Cinnaminson Township Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 552 F.
Supp. 855 (D.N.J. 1982); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406
A.2d 140 (1979); Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
67. 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976).
68. 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
69. Morrow, 548 P.2d at 281-82.
70. Cloud, 563 P.2d at 249. The plaintiffs alleged that the padding was defective
due to its highly flammable nature. Id. Additionally, they alleged that the mobile home
itself was defectively designed because it also was of a highly flammable nature. Id.
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The distinction between the two cases is that Morrow in-
volved a "lemon" and Cloud involved an unsafe product. 71
The Cloud court noted that deterioration and qualitative de-
fects should be considered economic loss while sudden and
calamitous damage should be recoverable in tort because it
results in property damage.72
In Cloud, the sudden, violent nature of the damage was
the determinative factor in classifying the loss as property
damage. Several other courts also limit recovery for damage
to the product itself to situations where the damage occurred
as a result of a sudden, violent event.73 These courts' rationale
for this emphasis on accidents is based on the distinction au-
thorities have drawn between property damage and economic
loss:
When the defect causes an accident "involving some vio-
lence or collision with external objects," the resulting loss is
treated as property damage. On the other hand, when the
damage to the product results from deterioration, internal
71. Cloud, 563 P.2d at 251. While the mobile homes in both cases were alleged to
be defectively manufactured, the defects resulted in different types of harm. Id.
72. Id.
73. A sudden, violent event has been a predominent consideration of the court in
several cases. For interesting discussions on the significance of this factor, see Vulcan
Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253 (1983). Under Georgia
law, recovery for damage to the defective product itself is allowed under a strict liability
theory only where the damage occurs through an accident. Id. at -, 306 S.E.2d at 254.
"An 'accident' should be defined as a sudden and calamitous event which, although it
may only cause damage to the defective product itself, poses an unreasonable risk of
injury to other persons or property." Id. at , 306 S.E.2d at 257. Another case, City of
Clayton v. Gruman Emergency Prods., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Mo. 1983), con-
tains an informative discussion on violent occurrences. Under Missouri law, the seller
of a defective product is liable for damage to the product itself only if the product was
damaged by a violent occurrence. Id. at 1124-25.
In Cloud, 563 P.2d 248, the court identified factors relevant in drawing the line
between property damage and economic loss: "We cannot lay down an all inclusive
rule to distinguish between the two categories; however, we note that sudden and ca-
lamitous damage will almost always result in direct property damage and that deteriora-
tion, internal breakage and depreciation will be considered economic loss." Id. at 251
(footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
In Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982),
the court distinguished property damage from economic loss by focusing on the cause of
the loss. "When the defect causes an accident 'involving some violence or collision with
external objects,' the resulting loss is treated as property damage. On the other hand,
when the damage to the product results from deterioration, internal breakage, or other
non-accidental causes, it is treated as economic loss." Id. at 83, 435 N.E.2d at 449
(citations omitted).
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breakage, or other non-accidental causes, it is treated as eco-
nomic loss.
7 4
A. The Pennsylvania Glass Three-Factor Approach
The occurrence of an accident is still a determining factor
considered by courts when classifying damage. The modem
trend, however, is moving away from a single factor analysis,
such as examining how the damage occurred. Instead, the
trend is toward analyzing the interrelationship of three fac-
tors: the manner in which the damage occurred, the nature of
the defect, and the type of damage alleged.75 This three-factor
approach was first utilized in Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co. ,76 and represented a radical departure
from the traditional approach of classifying damage by the
type of items (e.g., repairs, loss of profit, replacement cost) for
which recovery was sought. Each of the three Pennsylvania
Glass factors should be examined separately to give meaning
to the analysis.
FACTOR ONE: In analyzing the manner in which the
damage occurred, courts distinguish damage sustained in a
sudden, violent or calamitous occurrence from damage which
develops over a period of time.7 7 Damage from defects that
cause accidents of "violence or collision with external objects"
is more apt to create the traditional tort injuries of physical
harm to persons and other property. A vehicular collision, a
fire, an explosion and the collapse of a building have all been
classified as violent, calamitous events, 78 whereas damage
74. Note, supra note 6, at 918.
75. These factors resolve the question of whether a defect renders a product unsafe
or whether it makes a product ineffective. An unsafe product invokes the safety insur-
ance policy of tort law while an ineffective product invokes the expectation bargain
protection policy of warranty law. Pennsylvania Glass Sand v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981) (applying Pennsylvania law).
76. Id.
77. Where the damage develops over a period of time, the resulting damage is cate-
gorized as an economic loss. In Moorman, a feed processor sued the manufacturer of a
grain storage tank under a strict liability theory for damage resulting from a crack in
the tank. The court found that the crack developed over a period of time and was an
economic loss. Moorman, 91 111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443.
78. See Gibson v. Reliable Chevrolet, Inc., 608 S.W.2d 471, 473-74 (Mo. App.
1981) (the court defined a calamitous event as one likely to threaten traditional tort
injuries of bodily harm or damage to other nearby property - such as occurs in a case
involving unreasonably dangerous products).
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caused by a tornado has not been classified as a violent occur-
rence. Tornado damage is inflicted by an outside force and not
by an unreasonably dangerous defect inherent in the prod-
uct.79 In general, sudden and calamitous damage to the prod-
uct itself is classifed as property damage; damage which
develops over a period of time is considered an economic loss.
FACTOR TWO: A defect in a product can be qualitative
or quantitative. A quantitative defect poses a dangerous, un-
reasonable risk of injury to persons or their property. The
existence of a quantitative defect invokes the manufacturer's
responsibility to guard against making a product which entails
risk of personal injury or property damage - the principle
underlying tort law.80
A qualitative defect, on the other hand, causes a product
to deteriorate, suffer internal breakage or otherwise fail to per-
form its function due to a non-accidental cause.8' A qualita-
tive defect poses no risk of physical harm to persons or their
property. It impacts upon the victim's pocketbook, disap-
pointing his expectations, failing to live up to the bargain sup-
posedly made, 82 invoking the "buyer beware" concerns which
underlie contract law. Qualitative defects result in economic
loss; quantitative defects result in property damage.
79. See Clevenger & Wright Co. v. A.O. Smith Harvestore Prods., Inc., 625 S.W.2d
906, 909 (Mo. App. 1981) (The court denied the plaintiff recovery under a strict liability
in tort theory where his silo was damaged by a tornado. The court suggested that while
the tornado was violent, the concept of "violent occurrence" must be limited to the kind
of damage caused in situations similar to cases of unreasonably or "imminently danger-
ous" products).
80. "Accordingly, tort law imposes a duty on manufacturers to produce safe items,
regardless of whether the ultimate impact of the hazard is on people, other property, or the
product itself" Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, , 306 S.E.2d 253,
256 (1983) (emphasis in original).
81. A loss from a non-accidental cause occurred in City of Clayton v. Gruman
Emergency Prods., Inc., 576 F. Supp. 1122, (E.D. Mo. 1983) where the plaintiff
purchased a fire truck which inexplicably developed a lop-sided appearance. Soon after,
the plaintiff discovered numerous cracks in the frame of the truck. Id. at 1123. The
court characterized the cause of the damage as "mere deterioration or internal breakage
due to a defect in the product" as the truck had not been damaged by a collision. Id. at
1125-26 (quoting Gibson, 608 S.W.2d at 474).
82. The issue of a qualitative defect was encountered in Bagel v.American Honda
Motor Co., 132 Ill. App. 3d 82, -, 477 N.E.2d 54, 58 (1985), where the plaintiff
purchased a used motorcycle. Two years later, the engine ceased to function while the
motorcycle was idling in plaintiff's garage. The court barred a recovery under strict
liability because the damage did not occur in a manner which posed an unreasonable
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FACTOR THREE: The type of damage alleged may
range from a solely pecuniary loss to pecuniary loss coupled
with the risk of personal harm or physical damage to other
property. Again, the underlying concepts of tort and contract
come into play. 83 Where the resulting damage creates a safety
risk, property damage is involved. Where the resulting dam-
age creates only a risk to the victim's pocketbook, economic
loss is involved.
The Pennsylvania Glass court draws the line between tort
and contract by analyzing the inter-relationship of these fac-
tors. Where the factors indicate that safety or insurance issues
are involved, the remedy lies in tort. Where the factors indi-
cate that expectation of the bargain issues are implicated, the
remedy lies in contract.
B. Hybrid Cases: Straddling the Tort-Contract Line
The Pennsylvania Glass three-factor approach has been
utilized by courts in Illinois,84 Arizona85 and Georgia.86
risk of injury to the plaintiff or his property. The only loss was to the plaintiff's disap-
pointed commercial expectations. Id.
Other cases where a qualitative defect caused the plaintiff to suffer a benefit-of-the-
bargain loss include: Morrow, 548 P.2d 279 (defects made trailer unsuitable; court dis-
allowed tort recovery); Long v. Jim Lette Oldsmobile, Inc., 135 Ga. App. 293, 217
S.E.2d 602 (1975) (buyer may not recover in tort the reduced value of car which over-
heated); Nobility Homes v. Shiver, 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977) (plaintiffs sought dam-
ages for the reduced value of a mobile home that proved uninhabitable because of a
leaky roof, gaping floors and poorly installed door and windows).
83. The court in Pennsylvania Glass concluded that the type of damage alleged was
not conclusive on the issue of whether a loss was recoverable in tort or in contract:
In drawing this distinction, the items for which damages are sought, such as
repair costs, are not determinative. Rather, the line between tort and contract
must be drawn by analyzing interrelated factors such as the nature of the defect,
the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury arose. These factors bear
directly on whether the safety-insurance policy of tort law or the expectation-
bargain protection policy of warranty law is most applicable to a particular
claim.
Pennsylvania Glass, 652 F.2d at 1173.
84. Bagel, 132 I1. App. 3d 82, 477 N.E.2d 54. The court inquired into the type of
damage alleged, the nature of the defect and the manner in which the damage occurred.
Id. at -, 477 N.E.2d at 58.
85. Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Ariz. Diesel, Inc., 136 Ariz. 444, 666 P.2d
544 (1983). The court stated: "Each case must be considered on its own facts bearing in
mind the purposes of tort law recovery as contrasted with contract law." Id. at _, 666
P.2d at 548.
86. Vulcan Materials Co. v. Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253 (1983)
(applying Georgia law).
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While it represents a major step forward in drawing the line
between tort and contract recoveries, it has already proved
unwieldy in certain fact situations.
Some difficulty in applying the Pennsylvania Glass ap-
proach has been encountered by courts faced with "hybrid"
cases where the fact situations straddle the line between eco-
nomic loss and property damage. To date, four of these hy-
brid cases have been decided. Three cases8 7 involve the use of
asbestos products in school buildings, and the fourth8 8 in-
volves a compound contained in the mortar of a building.
In all three asbestos cases, the courts found that the use of
asbestos products in the construction of schools posed a grave,
unspeculative health hazard and thus raised the safety con-
cerns underlying the tort theory of strict liability.8 9 However,
when the courts applied the Pennsylvania Glass three-factor
test, the defect possessed qualities common to both tort and
contract law. For instance, the only actual damage sustained
was an economic loss, the cost of replacing the asbestos. 90
Additionally, the damage did not occur in a sudden or violent
manner. On the other hand, the nature of the defect was
quantitative in that the asbestos posed a dangerous, unreason-
able risk of harm to persons.
The courts also noted that the defect in the asbestos not
only rendered the product itself valueless, but also rendered
other property worthless, as the repair process necessitated re-
87. Cinnaminson Township Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 552 F.
Supp. 855 (D.N.J. 1982); School Dist. of Lancaster v. ASARCO, No. 1414, slip op.
(Philadelphia C.P. Dec. 6, 1983); Area vocational Tech. Bd. v. National Gypsum Co.,
No. 119, slip op. (Lancaster C.P. Sept. 7, 1983).
88. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank v. Dow Chem. Co., 605 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
89. The court in Cinnaminson stated:
In the instant case, the problem with USG's product is not that it did not perform
its function in the ceiling plaster, but rather that it posed a grave risk of personal
injury to those in contact with it. Thus, the manufacturer's responsibility to guard
against making a product which entails risk ofpersonal harm or property damage,
a major concern underlying the doctrine of strict liability in tort, is involved in this
case. The case does not primarily involve a problem with the product which
mandates its replacement or repair in order to perform its function, or a loss of
profit stemming from a defect in the product's performance, but rather the re-
placement of the product because of a grave personal safety risk.
Id. at 859 (emphasis added).
90. Cinnaminson, 552 F. Supp. at 856; ASARCO No. 1414, slip op.; National Gyp-
sum, No. 119, slip op.
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moval of ceilings and walls. 91 The courts resolved this di-
lemma by moving away from adherence to the calamitous
injury requirements and instead based their decisions on the
policy underlying tort law, holding that plaintiffs could re-
cover under the strict liability in tort theory.92
The court in Philadelphia National Bank v. Dow Chemical
Co. 93 also based its decision on the policy underlying tort law.
In Philadelphia National, the plaintiff alleged that the Dow
product, Sarabond, which was incorporated into the mortar of
the Philadelphia National Bank building, caused damage to
the building's infrastructure and cracking of the masonry on
the exterior of the building.94 Again, the court was faced with
a "hybrid" case. On one hand, the damage did not occur in a
sudden or violent manner, and the only actual damage was the
cost of repair and loss of use. On the other hand, the crum-
bling mortar and falling bricks posed a real risk of injury to
passers-by and other property. 95
Confronted with a dilemma because this case did not in-
volve a sudden, violent occurrence, the Philadelphia National
court questioned whether Pennsylvania Glass intended to
maintain a calamitous injury as a prerequisite to a tort recov-
ery.96 The court noted that Pennsylvania Glass spoke of the
risk of harm to people and property and the exposure of the
plaintiff to such a risk.97 Specifically, the defective product in
91. Cinnaminson, 552 F. Supp. at 859; ASARCO, No. 1414, slip op. National Gyp-
sum, No. 119, slip op.
92. But see National Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332
N.W.2d 39 (1983). The Nebraska court held that replacement costs incurred to prevent
a defective product from causing potential future physical harm were not recoverable in
tort. The court noted that the plaintiff did not raise fifteen actual product failures, one
which involved a death, in its complaint. Id. at _, 332 N.W.2d at 44.
93. 605 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
94. Id. at 61.
95. Judge Newcomer, writing for the Philadelphia Natl court, drew a distinction
between the risk sustained in the Pennsylvania Glass case and the risk sustained in the
Pennsylvania asbestos cases:
In the asbestos cases, as in the case before me, the product itself is inherently
dangerous to people. No outside intervention is required to make the defective
[product] hazardous. In [Pennsylvania Glass]... the defect became hazardous
only upon the occurrence of some unrelated danger such as a sudden fire or a
storm.
Id. at 64 n.5.
96. Id. at 62-63.
97. Id. at 63.
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Pennsylvania Glass posed a serious risk of harm to people,
even though no one was actually injured.98 The court also
noted that one Pennsylvania case99 has rejected the require-
ment of a calamitous injury as an essential element of a strict
liability in tort claim where only the defective product itself is
injured. The court concluded: "Pennsylvania would permit
recovery in tort where an allegedly defective construction pro-
ject causes injury to other components used in construction
and creates a real, unspeculative risk of harm to passers-by on
the street below." 100
When Morrow, Cloud, Pennsylvania Glass and Philadel-
phia National drew the line between property damage and
economic loss, they were in essence redrawing the line be-
tween tort and contract. These decisions suggest that a new
approach is required in evaluating whether an economic loss
is compensable under a strict liability tort theory. When these
decisions are coupled with the decisions in Spring Motors Dis-
tributors, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.101 and Henry Heide, Inc. v.
WRH Products Co., 12 the possibility of a new way out of the
tort-contract maze becomes more apparent.
C. Santor Revisited and Limited
In Spring Motors,0 3 the New Jersey Supreme Court
sharply limited its decision in Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc..
The court held that a commercial buyer seeking damages for
economic loss caused by a defective product could not recover
under a strict liability in tort theory.104 The court also abol-
98. Id.
99. The requirement of a sudden calamitous injury was rejected as an element of a
strict liability in tort claim in Pennsylvania by the court in Area Vocational Tech. Bd. v.
National Gypsum Co., No. 119, slip. op. (Lancaster C.P. Sept. 7, 1983).
100. Philadelphia Nat'l, 605 F. Supp. at 64.
101. 98 N.J. 555, 489 A.2d 660 (1985).
102. 766 F.2d 105 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying New Jersey law).
103. The plaintiff purchased a fleet of trucks which had defective transmissions.
The plaintiff did not claim that the trucks were unreasonably dangerous or that they
caused physical injury. Spring Motors, 191 N.J. Super. at _, 489 A.2d at 663-64.
104. Id. at _ 489 A.2d at 663. The New Jersey Supreme Court stated:
We hold that a commercial buyer seeking damages for economic loss resulting
from the purchase of defective goods may recover from an immediate seller and
a remote supplier in a distributive chain for breach of warranty under the
U.C.C., but not in strict liability or negligence. We hold also that the buyer need
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ished the privity requirement in actions for breach of
warranty. 0 5
In Henry Heide,06 the federal court of appeals, applying
New Jersey law, agreed with the district court that New
Jersey differentiates economic losses suffered by consumers
from those suffered by commercial entities:
For noncommercial entities, such as consumers, there is
often no private allocation of the risk of loss, and if there
were, it would be unfair to place the risk of loss on the con-
sumer rather than the manufacturer given the unequal re-
sources and bargaining positions of the parties. Thus, in
those circumstances, public policy will allocate the risk of
loss to the better riskbearer through the doctrines of strict
liability and negligence. When commercial parties of equal
bargaining power allocate the risk of loss by contract, how-
ever, there is a strong public policy to give effect to the pri-
vate allocation. Under the U.C.C., commercial parties can
allocate the risk of loss from defects through warranties, dis-
claimers and limitations on warranties. '0 7
The importance of these two decisions does not lie in their
limitation of a purely economic loss recovery to a non-com-
mercial buyer."1 After all, the Santor court itself applied its
decision to a fact situation where the victim was an ultimate
consumer. Rather, these decisions are significant because they
not establish privity with the remote supplier to maintain an action for breach of
express or implied warranties.
Id. at _ 489 A.2d at 663.
105. Id. at -, 489 A.2d at 663.
106. The plaintiff purchased plastic candy trays which did not suit the purpose for
which he bought them. The allegedly defective product was not unreasonably danger-
ous. Henry Heide, 766 F.2d at 107-08.
107. Id. at 109 (emphasis added).
108. Justice Peters, concurring and dissenting in Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal.
2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965), also suggested that the characterization of
the buyer should be determinative in deciding whether damages were recoverable in tort
or contract. Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 156-57, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28-29.
The majority recognize that the rules governing warranties were developed to
meet the needs of "commercial transactions." If this is so, then why not look to
the transaction between the buyer and the seller and see if it was a "commercial"
transaction rather than a sale to an ordinary consumer at the end of the market-
ing chain? How can the nature of the damages which occur later, long after the
transaction has been completed, control the characterization of the transaction?
Any line which determines whether damages should be covered by warranty law
or the strict liability doctrine should be drawn at the time the sale is made.
Id. at _ 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 28 (emphasis in original).
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are based on the distinct policies underlying tort and contract
law. Indeed, the Spring Motors court recognized the Uniform
Commercial Code as "the exclusive source for ascertaining
when a seller is subject to liability for damages if the claim is
based on intangible economic loss not attributable to physical
injury to person or harm to a tangible thing other than the
defective product itself."10 9
In contrast, prior to these decisions, the New Jersey court
applied the doctrine of strict liability in tort, rather than war-
ranty law, to hold a manufacturer accountable for placing a
defective product in the stream of commerce in situations
where privity of contract was absent. 110 The New Jersey
court, by abolishing the privity requirement in breach of war-
ranty actions and by basing its latest decision on the distinc-
tion between the policies underlying tort law and the Code,
has thus moved closer toward the approaches followed by
courts adhering to Seely v. White Motor Co.111
The United States Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of economic loss recovery under a products liability the-
ory in a land-based case. However, the Court has held that in
admiralty law, a products liability claim does not exist where
a commercial party alleges injury only to the product itself
where the injury results in purely economic loss. 112
In East River S. S. Corporation v. Transamerica Delaval,11 3
the corporation chartered four ships, each one equipped with
a turbine which Delaval designed, manufactured and in-
stalled.1 14 When the ships were put into service, the turbines
malfunctioned, causing injury only to the turbines themselves.
The East River S. S. Corporation sought damages for the cost
109. Spring Motors, 191 N.J. Super. at - 489 A.2d at 673 (quoting W. PROSSER &
W. KEETON, supra note 38, § 95A (emphasis in original)).
110. The New Jersey Court "has consistently emphasized that the basis for the
[strict liability] doctrine and the reason for holding the manufacturer liable to purchas-
ers who are not in privity is simply that a manufacturer should be accountable for
damages resulting from placing a product which is defective in the stream of com-
merce." Spring Motors, 191 N.J. Super at _, 465 A.2d at 540.
111. The plaintiffs in Spring Motors and Henry Heide would also have been denied
tort recoveries under the Pennsylvania Glass approach. Pennsylvania Glass would allow
a commercial buyer to recover under strict liability, but only where the product created
an unreasonable risk to safety. Pennsylvania Glass, 652 F.2d at 1175.
112. East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 106 S. Ct. 225 (1986).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2296.
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of repairing the ships and for income lost while they were out
of service.115
The Court held that admiralty jurisdiction applied.116 The
Court incorporated the principles of products liability into ad-
miralty law as its threshold decision. 117
Next, the Court addressed the issue of whether a commer-
cial product injuring only itself is the kind of harm against
which public policy requires manufacturers to protect, in-
dependent of any contractual duty.118 The Court noted that
in this case there was no damage to any property other than
the turbines themselves.1 1 9
The Court found that the land-based approach to whether
economic loss should be recoverable under a products liability
theory encompasses a wide spectrum of positions.120  The
Court, exercising traditional discretion in admiralty, 21
adopted an approach similar to that espoused in Seely, 12 2 and
held that a manufacturer in a commmercial relationship has
no duty under a products liability theory to prevent a product
from injuring itself. 23 However, the Court did not reach the
issue of whether a tort cause of action can be stated in admi-
ralty when the only damages sought are economic. 124
115. Id. at 2297.
116. Id. at 2298.
117. Id. at 2299.
118. Id. at 2300.
119. Id. While the components of the turbine damaged the turbine itself, the court
stated that since each turbine was supplied by Delaval as an integrated package, each
turbine is properly regarded as a single unit. Id.
120. Id. The Court chose not to adopt the minority or intermediate land-based
positions, stating:
The intermediate positions, which essentially turn on the degree of risk, are too
indeterminate to enable manufacturers easily to restructure their business behav-
ior. Nor do we find persuasive a distinction that rests on the manner in which
the product is injured .... Even where the harm to the product itself occurs
through an abrupt, accident-like event, the resulting loss due to repair costs,
decrease values and lost profits is essentially the failure of the purchase to receive
the benefit of its bargain - traditionally the core concern of contract law.
Id. at 2302.
121. Id.
122. 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
123. East River, 106 S. Ct. at 2302.
124. Id. at 2302 n.6.
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D. Wisconsin's Position on Economic Loss Recovery
While some courts have actively formulated a policy on
economic loss recovery in strict products liability, the Wiscon-
sin court has not yet formulated such a policy. The Supreme
Court of Wisconsin established Wisconsin as a member of the
majority of states which allow a strict liability in tort recovery
for property damage existing without personal injury in City
of La Crosse v. Schubert.125 The city hired the Schubert archi-
tectural firm to design and construct a roof for an elementary
school. 126 The roof leaked and subsequently blew off,' 27 dam-
aging the roof eaves. 28 The city sought the cost of replacing
the roof itself and the cost of repairing the eaves as damage
under a strict liability in tort action, alleging that the roof was
defectively designed. 29
The court held that the city was entitled to recover dam-
ages for both the roof and the eaves. 30 In dicta, the court,
relying upon Santor as authority, espoused the opinion that
Wisconsin would also allow recovery for a purely economic
loss in a strict liability in tort action.' 3'
In Leadfree Enterprises v. United States Steel Corp.,132 the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit ignored the dicta in
City of La Crosse and concluded that Wisconsin law precludes
recovery for purely economic loss in products liability.1 33 Ap-
plying Wisconsin law, the court further held that plaintiffs
who lacked a property interest in a product were barred from
125. 72 Wis. 2d 38, 240 N.W.2d 124 (1976). The Wisconsin Supreme Court al-
lowed recovery for damages to property and its component part in a cause of action
based on strict product liability. In City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, 58
Wis. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 855 (1973), a defective wheel on a fire truck caused the truck
to topple, yielding damage to both the fire truck and the wheel itself. The court allowed
recovery for repair and replacement of the defective wheel (the component part) and for
damages to the fire truck (the property).
126. City of La Crosse, 72 Wis. 2d at 40, 240 N.W.2d at 125.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 43, 240 N.W.2d at 127.
131. Id. at 45, 240 N.W.2d at 127.
132. 711 F.2d 805 (7th Cir. 1983).
133. Id. at 808. The court distinguished City of La Crosse as allowing recovery for
economic loss only where there is damage to other property as well as to the product
itself. Id. at 809.
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a recovery under a strict liability in tort theory. 134 The court
noted that section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts,
adopted by Wisconsin in Powers v. Hunt-Wesson Foods,
Inc.,135 limits liability for property damage "to property
owned by the plaintiff."' 136
The economic loss issue was next addressed in Twin Disc v.
Big Bud Tractor, Inc.,37 where an intermediate manufacturer
of tractors contracted to purchase tractor transmissions from
Big Bud. Due to a delay in the delivery of the transmissions,
Twin Disc incurred loss of profits. The federal district court
denied Twin Disc a recovery for this purely economic loss.138
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, stating
that it was unable to predict what Wisconsin courts would do
when presented with the fact situation of this case. 139 Signifi-
cantly, this case dealt with two commercial entities who had
the benefit of contractual remedies under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code. The Wisconsin courts have not addressed the
issue of whether a tort remedy should be available in a com-
mercial transaction or whether recovery is available for dam-
age to the product itself in the absence of personal injury or
injury to other property.14
134. Id. at 808.
135. 64 Wis. 2d 532, 219 N.W.2d 393 (1974); see Dippel v. Sciario, 37 Wis. 2d 443,
155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
136. Leadfree, 711 F.2d at 808.
137. 772 F.2d 1329 (7th Cir. 1985).
138. Twin Disc v. Big Bud Tractor, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 208, 213 (E.D. Wis. 1984).
The tort claim was dismissed because Big Bud was not an ultimate consumer, not be-
cause the alleged injury was of a purely economic nature. Significantly, the court said
Wisconsin allows recovery for economic losses in tort. Id.
139. Twin Disc, 772 F.2d at 1333-34.
140. Seely, 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17. Whether Wisconsin courts
allow for recovery in strict liability in tort where only the product itself is damaged is
not clearly settled. The Wisconsin Supreme Court in City of La Crosse stated in dicta
that a strict liability claim for pure economic loss involving the cost of repair or replace-
ment of the product itself and loss of profits is not demurrable. City of La Crosse, 72
Wis. 2d at 40, 240 N.W.2d at 125. Further, it cited the case of Air Prods. and Chems.
v. Fairbanks, 58 Wis. 2d 193, 206 N.W.2d 414 (1983), as standing for the proposition
that economic loss damages, equal to the cost of repair and loss of profits of the product,
are recoverable in a strict liability action. City of LaCrosse, 72 Wis. 2d at 38, 240
N.W.2d at 127. However, upon a thorough reading, the Air Prods. decision was not
adopted as precedent in Wisconsin. The Air Prods court stated: "The parties seek only
that this court apply Pennsylvania law in determining the outcome of this question and,
therefore, it would seem that any further extensions of the doctrine [of strict product
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IV. RESOLUTION OF THE CONTROVERSY: A UNIFIED
APPROACH
Most of the controversy over allowance of economic loss
recovery surrounds the courts' attempts to draw the line be-
tween property damage and economic loss in cases where the
plaintiff is seeking compensation for damage to the defective
product itself. A unified approach has yet to be adopted by
the courts in drawing this line.
Courts currently resolve four major areas of the economic
loss question in diverse ways. The areas of greatest divergence
include: whether to allow recovery for damage to the defec-
tive product itself; whether a calamitous event is required;
whether tort remedies should be extended to commercial buy-
ers; and whether recovery for damage to the product should
include consequential losses.
The first factor to consider is whether recovery should be
allowed under strict liability where the only damage is to the
product itself. Notably, only a minority of courts141 do not
allow recovery under strict liability where the only damage is
to the product itself. These courts have misinterpreted Seely
v. White Motor Co. In Seely, Justice Traynor recognized that
recovery under strict liability may apply to the product it-
self.142 Additionally, Dean Prosser, in distinguishing between
economic loss and physical injury, stated that "[t]here can be
no doubt that the seller's liability for negligence covers any
kind of physical harm, including not only personal injuries,
but also property damage to the defective chattel itself, as
liability] in Wisconsin will have to await consideration until another day." Air Prod&,
58 Wis. 2d at 216, 206 N.W.2d at 426.
The federal district court in Twin Disc cited A. E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc.,
62 Wis. 2d 479, 490, 214 N.W.2d 764, 770 (1974), as standing for the proposition that
Wisconsin allows recovery for economic loss in tort. Twin Disc, 582 F. Supp. at 213.
However, A. E. Inv. was based on a negligence theory, not a strict liability theory.
141. See cases cited supra note 4.
142. The plaintiff in Seely was denied a tort recovery for the repair of his truck
because he failed to prove that a defect in the truck caused the accident. Seely v. White
Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, _, 403 P.2d 145, 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 24. For a subsequent
decision where the California Supreme Court allowed recovery for damage to the prod-
uct itself, see Gherna v. Ford Motor Co., 246 Cal. App. 2d 639, 55 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966)
(auto destroyed in fire caused by defective part).
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where an automobile is wrecked by reason of its own bad
brakes." 143
The majority of courts' 44 have already construedsection
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts to allow recovery
for damage to the defective product itself as property damage
in certain instances.145 Hence, as a first step, all courts should
consider allowing recovery where the only damage is to the
defective product itself.
Next, where a defective product causes actual injury in a
sudden, violent or calamitous manner to a person, to property
or to the item itself, recovery should be available under strict
liability in tort. Most courts do require the occurrence of an
accident 146 where the only damage is to the product itself;
even courts which have adopted the Pennsylvania Glass Sand
Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co. three-factor approach 47 con-
sider a sudden, violent occurrence to be a determinative fac-
tor.' 48 However, neither actual injury nor a sudden, violent,
calamitous occurrence should be essential elements for a suc-
cessful claim under a strict liability in tort theory. 149
Not only should a calamitous occurrence be dropped as a
prerequisite for tort recovery, but there should be no need to
await the occurrence of actual physical damage to persons or
143. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 101, at 665 (4th ed.
1971).
144. See cases cited supra note 3.
145. See. e.g., Kassab v. Central Soya Corp., 432 Pa. 217, 246 A.2d 848 (1968):
The language of the Restatement, speaking as it does of injury to either the indi-
vidual or his property, appears broad enough to cover practically all of the harm
that could befall one due to a defective product. Thus, for example, were one to
buy a defective gas range which exploded, ruining the buyer's kitchen, injuring
him, and of course necessitating a replacement of the stove itself, all of these
three elements of the injury should be compensable. The last, replacing the
stove, has been sometimes referred to as "economic loss".... There would seem
to be no reason for excluding this measure of damages in an action brought
under the Restatement, since the defective product itself is as much 'property' as
any other possession of the plaintiffthat is damaged as a result of the manufactur-
ing flaw.
Id. at -, 246 A.2d at 854-55 n.7 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
146. See cases cited supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
147. See cases cited supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
148. See cases cited supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
149. See cases cited supra notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
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property. 0° Proof that a product poses an unreasonable risk
of harm, as in the asbestos cases,151 should be sufficient. 152 To
date, the issue of a defective product which poses an "un-
speculative risk" of harm has only arisen in building compo-
nent cases. 153 In these cases, a defective, unreasonably
dangerous product, incorporated into the structure of a build-
ing, endangered lives and required removal of the product
from the buildings.
Admittedly, allowing recovery for potential damage may
open the door to spurious claims. However, courts should be
able to formulate a reasonable stopping point using the "un-
speculative risk" standard154 set forth in Philadelphia National
Bank v. Dow Chemical Co..155 Clearly, where there is no ac-
tual damage, recovery in tort must be limited to those cases
150. Justice Traynor stated that whether the plaintiff is entitled to a recovery under
a strict liability theory should not be based on the fortuitousness of his suffering a per-
sonal injury. Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at -, 403 P.2d at 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 23. Justice
Peters, concurring and dissenting in Seely, stated,
I cannot rationally hold that the plaintiff whose vehicle is destroyed in an acci-
dent caused by a defective part may recover his property damage under a given
theory while another plaintiff who is astute or lucky enough to discover the de-
fect and thereby avoid such an accident cannot recover for other damages proxi-
mately caused by an identical defective part. The strict liability rule should
apply to both plaintiffs or to neither. They cannot be validly distinguished.
Id. at -, 403 P.2d at 154 n.2, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 26 n.2.
151. See cases cited supra note 87.
152. The requirement that an actual injury occur before a tort action arises is con-
trary to the principles underlying tort law. See Cinnaminson Township Bd. of Educ. v.
United States Gypsum Co., 552 F. Supp. 855, 859 (D.N.J. 1982) (risk of latent defect
placed on manufacturer, thus encouraging production of a safer product). See generally
Note, Comparative Contribution and Strict Tort Liability: A Proposed Reconciliation, 13
CREIGHTON L. REv. 889 (1980) (consumer compensation, risk distribution and deter-
rence of defective products form the rationale of products liability). Butsee National
Crane Corp. v. Ohio Steel Tube Co., 213 Neb. 782, 332 N.W.2d 39 (1983) (no recovery
without physical injury).
153. See cases cited supra notes 87 & 93.
154. See cases cited supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
155. 605 F. Supp. 60 (E.D. Pa. 1985). The majority in Seely feared that if recovery
were allowed in strict liability cases for economic loss, "the manufacturer would be
liable for damages of unknown and unlimited scope." Seely, 63 Cal. 2d at _ 403 P.2d
at 150-51, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 22. Justice Peters, concurring and dissenting in Seely, sug-
gests that this fear is unwarranted as the term "defective" in the strict liability doctrine
should be viewed as co-extensive with the well-defined and limitable concept of "un-
merchantable" in the implied warranty cases. Id. at _ 403 P.2d at 156, 45 Cal. Rptr.
at 28.
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where the defect in the product manifests itself in a manner
which imperils the physical safety of persons or property.
The next factor to consider is whether a commercial entity
should be able to recover in tort for an economic loss incurred
as a result of a defective product. In Pennsylvania Glass, the
court was willing to permit a commercial consumer to recover
in tort. 156 Many other courts have also permitted a commer-
cial consumer to recover under a products liability theory for
damage to the defective product itself.157 However, the New
Jersey court, which established the very liberal economic loss
recovery policy in Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc.,158 was not
willing to extend this policy to commercial buyers. 159
A commercial consumer who unknowingly buys a hazard-
ously defective product should not be restricted to a contract
remedy. A manufacturer has a duty to produce safe products,
and one of the objectives of products liability is to place the
risk of an unreasonably dangerous product on the manufac-
turer. 160 The underlying rationale is to encourage the manu-
facturer to produce safe products."6 This rationale exists
whether the purchaser is an ordinary consumer or a commer-
cial entity.
156. Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165,
1175 (3d Cir. 1981).
157. James v. Bell Helicopter Co., 715 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff, a corpo-
ration, provides helicopter services in U.S.); Pennsylvania Glass, 652 F.2d 1165 (plaintiff
owns quarry); Philadelphia Nat'l, 605 F. Supp. 60 (plaintiff owner of bank building);
Corporate Air Fleet, Inc. v. Gates Learjet, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1076 (M.D. Tenn. 1984)
(two corporations involved as plaintiffs); Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F.
Supp. 355 (N.D. Ohio 1979); Arrow Leasing Corp. v. Cummins Ariz. Diesel, Inc., 138
Ariz. 444, 666 P.2d 544 (1983) (plaintiff a corporation); Vulcan Materials Co. v.
Driltech, Inc., 251 Ga. 383, 306 S.E.2d 253 (1983) (plaintiff owns and operates rock
quarry); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 90 Ill. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982)
(plaintiff a commercial feed processor); Cova v. Harley Davidson Motor Co., 26 Mich.
App. 602, 182 N.W.2d 800 (1970) (plaintiff a golf course owner).
158. 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
159. Henry Heide, Inc. v. Writ Prods. Co., 766 F.2d 105, 109 (3d Cir. 1985). The
New Jersey Supreme Court stated that the extension of tort recovery to a commercial
entity is justifiable only where the buyer lacks equal bargaining as the entity is then in
the same hapless position as the ultimate consumer. Santor v. Karagheusian, Inc., 45
N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
160. See supra notes 53, 56 & 80 and accompanying text.
161. See supra 38-61 notes and accompanying text; Ghiardi, Two-Way Casualty
Between Insurance and Liability, 69 MARQ. L. REv. 33, 42-45 (1985) (insurance avail-
ablity impacts liability); Note, supra note 6 (insurance affects recovery).
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Courts which bar commercial consumers from recovery in
products liability need to shift the focus of their inquiry.
Whether a plaintiff is entitled to a recovery under strict liabil-
ity should be based on the nature of the claim and not on the
nature of the plaintiff.
Finally, once a recovery is permissible under a strict liabil-
ity in tort theory, traditional tort remedies should be avail-
able, even where the only damage is to the product itself.
Where the fact situation comports with the policy reasons un-
derlying tort,162 the victim should be compensated for losses,
no matter what type of damage is alleged. 163 There is no ra-
tional basis for allowing a person physically injured by a de-
fective product to recover for consequential losses while not
allowing a plaintiff with property rights in a defective product
to recover for consequential losses. 164
CONCLUSION
This Comment has traced the economic loss recovery con-
troversy from the time of its inception to modem courts' most
recent attempts at its resolution. It has examined what vari-
ous courts mean when they bar recovery for a purely eco-
nomic loss under a strict liability theory. Finally, it has
proposed a unified approach to the determination of whether a
particular loss should be recoverable under a strict liability
theory.
CATHY BELLEHUMEUR
162. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
163. The courts which allow recovery for damage to the defective product itself are
not in agreement on which items are recoverable. In Corporate Air Fleet, Inc. v. Gates
Learjet, Inc., 589 F. Supp. 1076, 1081 (M.D. Tenn. 1984), the court allowed recovery
for repair cost, but barred recovery for loss of use. In contrast, the Ohio court in Mead
stated that indirect economic losses, such as loss of business, were compensable under a
strict liability tort theory. Mead Corp. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 355,
366 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
164. See cases cited supra notes 20, 35 & 137 and accompanying text; Seely, 63 Cal.
2d at -, 403 P.2d at 155, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 27 (Peters, J., concurring and dissenting).
But see Note, supra note 6, at 964-66.
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